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CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHT?  
THE USE OF FORCE TO IMPOSE 
DEMOCRACY AND THE ARTHURIAN 
DILEMMA IN THE MODERN ERA 
SCOTT THOMPSON∗ 
Every impulse to protect the weak and help the infirm is noble. The impulse to use the 
means at our disposal to liberate a people from a government that poses no imminent or 
prospective threat to us, but is so despotic, violent, and vicious that those suffering under 
it cannot shake it off, is also noble. The action that gives effect to that impulse may 
sometimes be internationally lawful. It may sometimes be feasible. It is often—but not 
always—misconceived.1 
 W. Michael Reisman, Professor of Law, Yale Law School 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Anyone familiar with the ancient lore surrounding King Arthur, Merlyn, 
and the Knights of the Round Table is probably also familiar with the nascent 
king’s struggle with whether “might makes right.”2 After a Socratic discussion 
with his teacher Merlyn, Arthur, the idealistic student, rejects the famous 
aphorism and determines that the converse is true—right makes might. Or at 
least that it should be true. But the strength of Arthur’s conviction is put to the 
test when his beloved wife Guenever is wooed away to France by Sir Lancelot. 
Once something he desires is at stake, Arthur reneges on his previous 
conviction and uses force to exact vengeance on Lancelot and the French. 
Arthur’s struggle is one that continues today on a much larger stage and 
with much larger stakes. In contemporary parlance, the question of whether 
might makes right translates into the geopolitical question of whether it is 
acceptable and desirable to impose democracy by force. Does the ability to 
nation-build give one the right to do so? Does the end justify the means? 
The saliency and complexity of the contemporary debate over whether 
nations should use force, an often-condemned means, to establish democracy, a 
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generally lauded end, can be evinced by the self-conflicting statements of the 
most prominent U.S. leaders. Before being elected President, George W. Bush 
vocally denounced the practice of nation-building.3 In one stump speech after 
another during the 2000 presidential campaign, Bush declared, “I don’t think 
our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation-building.”4 He criticized Al 
Gore, stating, “I’m worried about an opponent who uses nation-building and 
the military in the same sentence.”5 But in one of the more famous “flip-flops” 
in recent political history, once in office and confronted with an array of 
daunting foreign-policy challenges, President Bush became an active nation- 
builder.6 The President used force to bring the Taliban to its knees and create a 
fledgling democracy in Afghanistan. He then invaded Iraq with the end goal of 
establishing a democracy there, as well.7 Similarly contradictory sentiments have 
been expressed by presidential hopeful Senator Barack Obama, who declared 
that “we should be more modest in our belief that we can impose democracy on 
a country through military force. . . . [W]e should be clear that the institutions of 
democracy—free markets, a free press, a strong civil society—cannot be built 
overnight, and they cannot be built at the end of a barrel of a gun.”8 In the very 
same speech, though, Obama praised those who “built democracy’s arsenal to 
vanquish fascism, and who then built a series of alliances and a world order that 
would ultimately defeat communism,”9 seeming to extol and vindicate the 
previous U.S. efforts to impose democracy by force. Indeed, at least part of the 
Cold War involved “hot” wars that were, in some instances, efforts to combat 
communist satellite states and install “democratic” bulwarks. These two leaders’ 
struggles to nail down a definitive answer on whether force should ever be used 
to impose democracy exemplify some of the challenges in evaluating the 
practice. The goal of this note is to further unpack these legal, moral, and 
political complexities and to provide the start of an answer. 
Part II will address whether the use of force to impose democracy passes 
international legal muster. Part III will address the practicalities and policy 
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questions to be considered when deciding whether to impose democracy 
through force. The conclusion to each of these sections will be the same: that 
democracy through force is not only illegal, but also impracticable and 
undesirable from a policy perspective. But the similarity between the 
conclusions of Parts II and III should not lead one to believe that the debate 
about imposing democracy through force is a clear-cut one. Far from it.  
II 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
Of the two perspectives on imposing democracy through force, the law 
probably provides the more definitive answer. The United Nations Charter, a 
binding, multilateral treaty, serves as the bedrock foundation governing the use 
of international military force.10 In no uncertain terms, Chapter I, Article 2(4) 
prohibits the use of force by states against other states. It declares that “[a]ll 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”11 
Moreover, the Preamble of the Charter affirms that its goals are to “save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” to “maintain international 
peace and security,” and to “live together in peace.”12 
The Charter identifies two exceptions to this general prohibition on the use 
of force. First, Chapter VII, Article 39, states that the UN Security Council shall 
determine whether a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression exists.13 If the Security Council so determines, Article 42 gives it the 
power to authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace 
and security in the event that other actions not involving armed force prove 
ineffective.14 Hence, for democracy through force to be legal under this 
provision of the Charter, it must be sanctioned by the Security Council. 
The second exception comes in Chapter VII, Article 51, which preserves a 
nation’s “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.”15 By its terms, Article 51 seems to indicate that there must be an 
actual, armed attack before a nation could respond in self-defense. Thus, 
presumptively, for the imposition of democracy through force to be legal under 
this section, it would have to be in response to an actual armed attack.16 Even 
 
 10. MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 210 (2005). 
 11. UN Charter art. 2, para. 4, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter. 
 12. UN Charter pmbl. 
 13. UN Charter art. 39. 
 14. UN Charter art. 42. 
 15. UN Charter art. 51. 
 16. There is some reason to believe that self-defense under Article 51 can be anticipatory in nature 
and in response to imminent threats as opposed to actual attacks. See discussion infra Part II.  
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then, however, the use of force would be constrained by the conditions of 
necessity and proportionality,17 which are rules of customary international law.18 
Necessity and proportionality would require the initial armed attack to be so 
extensive as to require a regime change to extinguish the threat.19 Presumably, 
examples of armed attacks that would legally justify such an extensive use of 
force were those during World War II in response to expansionism by Japan 
and Germany. Ostensibly, nothing short of all-out control and reforming the 
Japanese and German governments would have sufficed to eliminate the threat 
those nations posed. As a consequence, the Allied response arguably met the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality. 
In addition, there is a generally recognized right to anticipatory self-
defense.20 Prior to adoption of the UN Charter, which established the right to 
self-defense outlined in Article 51, customary international law permitted a 
nation to pursue a would-be aggressor before it actually attacked, and to 
exercise defensive force when a threat was imminent. Following the Suez Canal 
Crisis in 1956, debate emerged about whether Article 51 had extinguished 
previously established customary law, including this right to anticipatory self-
defense, and about whether Article 51 includes the customary interpretation 
that a nation need not wait for the would-be aggressor to actually attack, but 
could instead engage when the threat was imminent.21 The debate became 
largely immaterial, however, because the right to anticipatory self-defense 
survives, one way or another, and was later recognized as extant during the Six 
Day War. When debating whether the Israeli attack on Egypt during the Six 
Day War of 1967 was justified under Article 51, the UN General Assembly 
seemed to recognize the right to anticipatory self-defense.22 This debate 
surrounding the Six Day War convinced many to interpret Article 51 as 
sanctioning the use of force in “anticipatory self-defense, whe[n] an attack was 
 
 17. The requirement for such restraint was a part of the original formulation surrounding 
anticipatory self-defense as formulated by Daniel Webster after the Caroline affair. See infra notes 25–
26 and accompanying text. 
 18. Customary international law exists or is created when two criteria are met. The first is an 
objective criterion that focuses on whether there is general and consistent state practice. The second, 
more subjective criterion, known as opinio juris, requires that the state action in question be taken out 
of a sense of legal obligation. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1031 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]; Mary Ellen O’Connell, Taking Opinio Juris Seriously: A 
Classical Approach to International Law on the Use of Force, in CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ON THE USE OF FORCE: A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 9, 13 (Enzo Cannizzaro & Paolo Palchetti 
eds., 2005). 
 19. See O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 278–79 (referring to an ICJ advisory opinion discussing the 
“well established” rules of necessity and proportionality). 
 20. Stephen J. Cox, Comment: Confronting Threats Through Unconventional Means: Offensive 
Information Warfare as a Covert Alternative to Preemptive War, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 881, 903 (“That 
customary international law recognized this right [of anticipatory self-defense] well before Article 51 
existed is not debated.”). 
 21. Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 45 (Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. ed., 2d ed. 1991); see also 
O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 246 (examining the concept of imminence after Israel’s Six Day War). 
 22. O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 246; Cox, supra note 20, at n.141. 
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imminent or occurring, even if it had not yet occurred.”23 Hence, either as a 
matter of surviving custom or under Article 51, anticipatory self-defense is still 
a legitimate use of force under international law. Whether the right of 
anticipatory self-defense exists as a result of custom or by adoption of Article 51 
is significant only to the extent that custom would limit it to individual self-
defense, whereas the Charter would establish a right of collective self-defense. 
The key inquiry regarding anticipatory self-defense, whether it be under the 
Charter itself or under customary international law, is whether the attack is 
imminent. A hard-and-fast rule is hard to craft, but some examples help 
illustrate the outer edges of what is “imminent.” The principle of anticipatory 
self-defense was born out of a dispute between the United States and Britain in 
1837, when the British attacked a private U.S. vessel, the Caroline.24 At the time, 
the British were at war with Canada and suspected the Caroline of bringing 
munitions to Canadian insurgents. U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster 
claimed that the only way to justify an anticipatory attack of this kind was if the 
“necessity of self-defence [was] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means and no moment for deliberation”25 Webster further contended that the 
response must entail “nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified 
by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept 
clearly within it.”26 British Minister of Defense Lord Ashburton seemed to 
agree on the standard of imminence, but disagreed as to exactly what events or 
behavior constituted “imminence”—he claimed the situation of the Caroline fit 
Webster’s description of what justified anticipatory self-defense “in as high a 
degree as [did] any case of a similar description in the history of nations.”27 
Nevertheless, Webster’s formulation of imminence became woven into the 
fabric of customary international law. 
The debate about the standard’s scope reemerged a century later in 1967 
with Israel’s military response to Egypt’s military build-up along its border just 
prior to the Six Day War. The military build-up and posturing by Egypt was 
seen by most of the international community as justifying Israel’s attack: the 
threat to Israel was imminent enough.28 But the Security Council condemned 
 
 23. O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 246. 
 24. See Wolf Schäfer, Learning from Recent History, Provost’s Lecture on Global Issues at Stony 
Brook University n.2 (Oct. 15, 2003), http://www.sunysb.edu/globalhistory/PreventiveWar.shtml; 
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 28. See O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 246. 
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Israel’s subsequent attack and the destruction of a nearly completed Iraqi 
nuclear reactor as unjustified—no imminent threat had existed.29 
Though no bright line exists between what is and is not imminent, these and 
other examples30 demonstrate a general consensus that a visible mobilization of 
military forces constitutes an imminent threat, but simply building nuclear 
reactors or less-threatening weapons arguably does not. For the imposition of 
democracy through force to be justified as anticipatory self-defense, then, a 
nation would have to demonstrate that the absence of democracy, or the state’s 
failed or rogue status, posed an imminent threat to its security, one so massive 
as to justify total regime change. Given how “imminent threat” has so far been 
interpreted, it would be extremely difficult, even under the most liberal 
interpretation, to justify such an attack as anticipatory self-defense. 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has offered a 
more expansive view of imminent threat and armed attack as a basis for 
invoking the right to anticipatory self-defense. The National Security Council 
(NSC) argues in its 2002 report, The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America, that the concept of imminent threat must be adapted to deal 
with rogue states and terrorists who do not employ conventional means.31 The 
NSC further contends that as the size of the threat or the magnitude of the 
harm expands, the need for certainty that the attack will occur correspondingly 
decreases. Moreover, given that a missile could be fired from the Middle East 
and reach the United States in a matter of minutes, the threshold or imminence 
of the threat is heightened. Witness the birth of the “Bush Doctrine” and its 
focus on merging anticipatory self-defense with the principle of preemption. 
Indeed, as early as the Afghanistan conflict, “[U.S.] officials and decision-
makers who sought to solve the Afghanistan problem inflated the principle of 
self-defense so that international law would not be constrained by matters of 
temporal limitation, such as the imminence of future attacks or the need for 
immediacy required to repel an actual attack.”32 In justifying the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq, the Bush Administration relied in part on Iraq’s alleged build-up of 
weapons of mass destruction, its support of terrorists, and the rogue nature of 
Saddam Hussein’s leadership as posing a sufficiently imminent threat.33 The 
Administration used this alleged threat of Iraq to justify not only initial U.S. 
attacks, but also the regime change that ensued and U.S. efforts to install 
 
 29. See S.C. Res. 487 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981), as reprinted in O’CONNELL, supra 
note 10, at 252–53. 
 30. See, e.g., Michael J. Kelly, Time Warp to 1945—Resurrection of the Reprisal and Anticipatory 
Self-Defense Doctrines in International Law, 13 J. TRANSNT’L L. & POL. 1, 29 (discussing how the U.S. 
blockade was a use of force, but was generally accepted by the Security Council as justified in response 
to the imminent threat posed by nuclear warheads in Cuba). 
 31. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. 
 32. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security Doctrine and the Rule of 
Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 375, 380 (2004). 
 33. President George W. Bush, Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002),  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). 
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democracy. According to the contemporary U.S. government interpretation, 
therefore, democracy through force is legally justified whenever a state 
postured similarly to Iraq or Afghanistan exists. 
The extent to which the Bush interpretation of preemption is international 
law, however, is questionable. The U.S. action in Iraq, though supported by the 
Coalition of the Willing, was not endorsed by the Security Council and was 
condemned by much of the international community.34 This lack of consensus, 
and the dearth of other uses of force justified rhetorically on similar grounds, 
indicate that the Bush Doctrine, as embodied in the 2002 National Security 
Strategy, has not reached the level of widespread practice or opinio juris 
necessary to be considered customary international law. As a result, democracy 
through force, without more, is probably still illegal under international law. 
Another potential avenue for legally justifying the imposition of democracy 
through force is as a response to humanitarian crises. Although the Charter 
does not explicitly authorize interventions to alleviate humanitarian crises, 
there is some debate as to whether either pre-Charter- or newly developed 
international custom permits it. Pre-Charter humanitarian interventions are 
numerous, including interventions by France, Britain, and Russia against 
Turkish massacres of Greeks in 1830; the intervention in 1860 by Austria, 
France, Britain, and others in Syria; and the 1877 Russian intervention in 
Turkey in response to Turkey’s persecution of Christians in Eastern Europe.35 
Whether these and other instances of humanitarian interventions constitute 
customary international law is far from clear. Many scholars think they do;36 
other scholars do not.37 What matters more than the intellectual community’s 
acceptance of the practice of humanitarian intervention is government practice 
and acceptance. Such international acceptance is hard to gauge, and that 
ambiguity makes the argument that humanitarian intervention is established 
law difficult to maintain.38 Indeed, it is doubtful that the pre-Charter 
interventions were taken out of a sense of legal obligation.39 Further, in many 
cases, humanitarian interventions—such as those in Greece, Syria, and 
 
 34. Richard Stevenson & Warren Hoge, Bush, and Allies Will Meet to Seek Ways to Sway U.N., 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2003, at A1; Chirac Says France Will Veto U.N. Resolution on Iraq, ONLINE 
NEWSHOUR, Mar. 10, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/iraq_03-10-03.html (last visited Feb. 
18, 2008). 
 35. Richard Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for 
Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229 (John Norton Moore 
ed., 1974), as reprinted in O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 306–15. 
 36. O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 307–08 (listing scholars such as “Grotius, Vattel, Wheaton, 
Heiberg, Woolsey, Bluntschli, Westlake” (quoting Manouchehr Ganji)). 
 37. Id. (listing scholars Ganji and Brownlie); see also Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in 
LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD, supra note 35, at 217, as reprinted in O’CONNELL, 
supra note 10, at 299–306. 
 38. PETER MALANCZUK, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE USE 
OF FORCE 11 (1993). 
 39. See Brownlie, supra note 37, as reprinted in O’CONNELL, supra note 10, at 300–01. 
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Turkey—were accompanied by ulterior motives as the balance of power in 
Europe was shifting.40 
Assuming arguendo that pre-Charter custom did authorize humanitarian 
intervention, the question remains whether that custom survived the Charter. 
Some argue that given the Charter’s main purposes—to maintain peace and 
protect human rights—humanitarian interventions are still legal, even though 
the Charter does not specifically authorize them. Others contend that the 
Charter bans the use of force only to the extent that it affects the “territorial 
integrity” or “political independence” of the state against which force is 
directed.41 Further, especially since the end of the Cold War, humanitarian 
interventions have become increasingly frequent—notable examples being 
Kosovo and, albeit belatedly, Rwanda. Nevertheless, the international 
community seems to lack a strong degree of consensus on the issue. It would be 
hard to say that the practice has become so ubiquitous as to entrench it in the 
law or that when nations did intervene, they did so out of a sense of legal (as 
opposed to moral) obligation. The questions and scrutiny surrounding NATO’s 
activities in the Balkans during the 1990s exemplify the lack of crystallization 
required for a custom to take shape.42 Moreover, the world community’s 
reluctance to intervene militarily in the Sudan indicates that, despite an 
ostensible genocide, much of the world views unilateral humanitarian 
intervention as lacking the force of law. The world community is reticent to act 
in the absence of Security Council approval.43 
Thus, it is doubtful that humanitarian interventions represent valid 
expressions of the use of force under international law. But even if they did, 
they would still be limited by the just-war requirements of proportionality and 
necessity, which apply equally to measures of humanitarian intervention and 
self-defense.44 This is to say, even if intervening were legal, imposing a new 
regime would be acceptable only when the local government was incapable of 
changing its behavior. In many circumstances—such as Rwanda—total regime 
 
 40. Id.; MALANCZUK, supra note 38, at 7. 
 41. UN Charter art. 2, para. 4; See also Lillich, supra note 35, as reprinted in O’CONNELL, supra 
note 10, at 308; AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL 
CONCEPT: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND DEFINITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 120–21 (1979). 
 42. See DANA H. ALLIN, INT’L INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATO’S BALKAN 
INTERVENTIONS, 347 ADELPHI PAPERS 57–59 (2002); Anup Shah, The Kosovo Crisis, GLOBAL ISSUES, 
Jan. 21, 2001, http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Kosovo.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2008) 
(demonstrating the widespread and divergent debate surrounding the legality of force in the face of 
humanitarian crises and how crystallization of custom has occurred as a result). 
 43. TED DAGNE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SUDAN: HUMANITARIAN CRISIS, 
PEACE TALKS, TERRORISM, AND U.S. POLICY 7 (2006), available at http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/ 
RL33574.pdf. There may be other geopolitical reasons why countries such as the United States have 
been unwilling to act in Sudan. Such reasons include hope for a peaceful settlement, involvement by the 
African Union, and fears of American military overstretch. 
 44. Eric A. Heinze, Waging War for Human Rights: Toward a Moral Legal Theory of 
Humanitarian Intervention, 3 HUM. RTS. & HUM. WELFARE 83, 85 (2003), available at 
http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/volumes/2003/heinze-2003.pdf. 
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change will be the only plausible option. In others, perhaps a more limited 
intervention is possible. 
That said, there seems to be an emerging body of practice and belief that in 
some situations—when the atrocities are so egregious—nations should not sit 
around idly waiting for Security Council authorization before acting. And in 
some instances, working to reinstall a more benevolent government, 
presumably a democratic one, will be the only tenable path forward. Indeed, in 
the wake of NATO’s unauthorized aerial attacks on Serbia, then-Secretary–
General of the UN, Kofi Annan, said, 
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use of 
force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might ask—not in the context 
of Kosovo—but in the context of Rwanda: If, in those dark days and hours leading up 
to the genocide, a coalition of States had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi 
population, but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition 
have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?45 
This rhetorical question no doubt provides its own answer. Unilateral or 
multilateral action in these circumstances, though perhaps not authorized by the 
letter or by customary law, would have nevertheless been acceptable. The 
difficulty is determining when such an atrocity is occurring, and, of course, who 
is to make that determination. Certainly not the UN—that is the very body that 
Annan recognizes was too slow to act. Allowing nations to decide unilaterally 
when the situation necessitates, first, intervention and, second, the completion 
of the job by installing a new government, opens up a fairly large loophole in 
international law for the use of force with no potential check except the 
opprobrium of the international community. In many cases such opprobrium 
may be sufficient; in others, perhaps not. Certainly, world opinion had staying 
power—even for the United States in the context of Iraq. Although ultimately 
the Bush Administration flouted the Security Council, it mounted an intense 
campaign and delayed action to try and appease the international community 
and gain as much rhetorical, if not military, support as possible.46 
Nevertheless, under current international law, except perhaps in the most 
extreme “dark days and hours,” might does not make right. The UN Charter’s 
prohibition on the use of force applies equally to force used to impose 
democracy, however noble the purpose. If the Security Council authorizes the 
action, it is, of course, legal. If the use of force is in response to a massive 
invasion or attack by a hostile state, such as those witnessed during the Second 
World War, it would arguably be legal to retaliate and impose a new rule of law. 
If the Bush Doctrine gains wider acceptance in the international community, 
then perhaps the doctrine of preemption will authorize democracy through 
 
 45. Press Release, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. SG/SM/7136, GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 1999), quoted in Reisman, supra note 1, at 521. 
 46. See, e.g., How Powell’s Evidence Compares to Findings from Prior Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 7, 2003, at A11; Powell: Iraq Hiding Weapons, Aiding Terrorists, CNN ONLINE, Feb. 6, 2003, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.un (last visited Feb. 18, 2008) (illustrating efforts the 
United States undertook to persuade the international community). 
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force, though it would still be limited by the principle of proportionality. But 
until then, absent Security Council authorization or an armed attack, imposing 
democracy through force is illegal under international law. 
III 
POLICY PERSPECTIVE 
The question whether might makes right has been answered in the negative 
from a legal perspective. Although strong arguments support it, imposing 
democracy through force is similarly undesirable from a policy perspective. The 
main arguments in its support are aligned along two different themes—one 
liberal, one conservative. The liberal theme focuses on the humanitarian aims of 
imposing democracy—giving people political and economic freedom. The more 
conservative theme revolves around security—reducing, in the short-term, any 
direct threat posed by dictators hostile to democratic interests and, in the long 
term, leading to a more interdependent, democratic world that is less likely to 
engage in warfare. The policy arguments opposed to imposing democracy 
through force focus on the principles of sovereignty and pluralism, as well as on 
the obstacles to actually being successful at bringing about democracy. Finally, 
the risks of violence and immediate loss of lives are obvious and compelling 
reasons why the policy is undesirable. 
A. Why Might Should Make Right 
The conservative argument for supporting a policy of permitting the 
imposition of democracy through force is that it enhances security for the 
already democratic world. As Francis Fukuyama has described it, “[t]he fact is 
that the chief threats to us and to world order come today from weak, collapsed, 
or failed states. Weak or absent government institutions in developing countries 
form the thread linking terrorism, refugees, AIDS, and global poverty.”47 
According to Fukuyama and other pro-interventionists, the only way to turn 
these “weak” states into stable ones that no longer pose military threats, 
terrorism threats, or AIDS threats is to intervene and establish cure-all 
democratic institutions. To Fukuyama, democracy, once in place, will lead to a 
more peaceful, stable country: “A lot now rides on our ability not just to win 
wars but to help create self-sustaining democratic political institutions and 
robust market-oriented economies, and not only in these two countries 
[Afghanistan and Iraq] but throughout the Middle East.”48 
There are a few problems with Fukuyama’s view that the existence of failed 
states justifies intervention to impose democracy. For starters, it is difficult to 
ascertain both when a state is truly failed or weak enough to pose a significant 
threat to the international community and who is responsible for making that 
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determination.49 If individual states are able to act unilaterally to impose 
democracy, then without question the door is opened for opportunism as 
nations that seek to gain from the invasion are confronted with few obstacles. 
Moreover, whereas intervention in unstable and potentially dangerous states 
may reduce some security risks, invasion also creates new, often more-
dangerous risks. The war in Iraq demonstrates that although one threat 
(Saddam Hussein) was removed, the war sparked sectarian violence and, by 
destabilizing a country, created a terrorist training and recruiting ground.50 As 
recognized by the National Intelligence Estimate, the war in Iraq has served as 
a rallying cry for radical Muslims and as a powerful recruiting tool, increasing 
the threat of attack against the United States.51 Violence and war often create 
opportunities for other security and humanitarian threats such as the spread of 
disease52 and refugee camps.53 Moreover, conflict often inevitably leads to food 
shortages as economies slow or stop in order to cope with the violence. 
Nevertheless, those advocating the imposition of democracy through force 
point to the internationally recognized effects of democracy in promoting 
individual liberty and economic development. In 1998, then-Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan issued a report entitled “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion 
of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa,”54 which focused on 
and emphasized the crucial role democracy can play in cultivating “an 
environment where peace and development can flourish.”55 No doubt 
establishing democratic governance is a laudable goal, and the economic 
interdependence often associated with it can lead to a more peaceful world.56 
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Indeed, U.S. Presidents as different as Ronald Reagan57 and Bill Clinton58 have 
emphasized that democracies tend not to wage war against each other; both 
Presidents considered democracy-promotion an important “pillar” of their 
foreign policies. That the spread of mature democracies helps reduce conflict, 
promote economic development, and increase individual liberty, however, does 
not necessarily mean that the best means by which to bring about democracy is 
through force. It is inherently contradictory and oxymoronic to say that the best 
way to create a peaceful, secure world is through conflict. Moreover, an 
empirical study conducted by Mansfield and Snyder reveals that nations which 
take quick leaps from autocracy, or even a mixed democratic–autocratic regime, 
to democracy are more likely to engage in international conflict than are 
autocracies.59 As Mansfield and Snyder’s evidence indicates, though a world of 
mature democracies “would be safer and preferable,” promoting democracy too 
rashly—much less imposing it—may create more danger, at least in the short 
term, than it alleviates.60 
A conservative argument for opposing U.S. intervention abroad—one that 
heralds back as far as the Monroe Doctrine—is that the United States will be 
more secure at home if it focuses on securing its own borders and region rather 
than meddling in the affairs of other governments and attempting to eradicate 
threats abroad. Henry Kissinger has noted, “No other nation has ever advanced 
such goals [as humanitarian intervention or forcibly imposed democracy], which 
risk maneuvering the United States and its allies into the role of world 
policeman.”61 Moving the United States into the position of a world police force 
not only runs the risk of overstretching the military, but also imposes direct 
security threats by putting U.S. troops in harm’s way for causes that are, 
potentially, of little strategic interest. This is an unacceptable position from the 
perspective of a conservative realist such as Kissinger.62 
The liberal argument for supporting forcibly imposed democracy is that 
government oppression results in horrible human suffering. To sit back and 
watch that suffering would be inhumane. Following horrors such as the 
Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide, the world always says “never again”—
but atrocities such as these continue to happen. No doubt the humanitarian 
argument is a powerful one in favor of using force to compel a regime change 
and to install democracy. But given the legal implications of forcibly imposing 
democracy,63 military action should only be used in the most egregious 
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situations. And even then, force should be used only to the extent necessary to 
avert disaster. If that means overturning the government and setting up a new 
one, so be it. But if not, then a nation’s sovereignty should be respected to 
whatever extent possible. Obviously there will be differences of opinion as to 
whether action should be taken and how far such action should go. Unilateral 
action raises a dangerous specter of lawlessness and a lack of respect for 
sovereignty, which is the cornerstone of international peace. Yet, as then-
Secretary-General Annan pointed out, the UN is often too slow. Regardless of 
who ultimately makes the decision to authorize attack, though, it should only be 
made in the rarest and most horrible circumstances. 
These arguments in favor of imposing democracy through force are not 
without significant merit. Certainly a world full of democracies would likely be 
a much more stable, peaceful one. It would likely also be one in which there is 
less oppression and more protection for individual freedom. The benefits are 
vitiated, however, by the enormous costs and the fact that, as a means of 
change, force is unlikely to be successful in reaching its objective. 
B. Why Right Should Make Might 
John F. Kennedy once said, 
[W]e must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient—
that we are only six percent of the world’s population—that we cannot impose our will 
upon the other [ninety-four] percent of [human]kind—that we cannot right every 
wrong or reverse each adversity—and that therefore there cannot be an American 
solution to every world problem.64 
These words embody two of the main arguments for opposing the forcible 
imposition of democracy. The first is that the United States, or the West in 
general, does not have a monopoly on good ideas or effective ways to govern 
and solve problems. The second is that even if the West were so enlightened, it 
does not have the resources to enforce democracy in the rest of the world. 
Kennedy’s first point emphasizes that the notion of forcibly imposing 
democracy brings with it more than just a hint of western arrogance. 
Democracy no doubt holds a promise of political enfranchisement and equality, 
and for many nations it has been the primary tool for ensuring such inalienable 
rights as those recognized in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.65 
Further, when western-style democracy and the freedoms associated with it are 
juxtaposed to “wicked and violent” regimes, democracy might understandably 
be seen as the obvious and only replacement.66 But as easy as it is to recognize 
the shortfalls of an existing regime, “[i]t is difficult and indeed culturally 
arrogant to determine what sort of contextually workable regime should replace 
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it.”67 Those who would impose democracy must recognize that “their own model 
may not fit the local political culture or cultures.”68 After all, Leon Trotsky 
believed that once people around the globe saw the sublimity of Bolshevism, 
they would overthrow their current governments and transform them into 
communist ones.69 This same “democratic Trotskyism” exists today.70 But by 
assuming that democracy is a panacea—the “be all and end all”—pro-
interventionists ignore a host of countervailing factors that may make 
democracy unworkable. Such factors include religion, language, culture, 
nationalism, and other types of identity.71 Democratic Trotskyism ignores that 
the people of a given country may have different traditions or ideas that may be 
more suitable to their culture, religion, or other attributes than western-style 
representative democracy. 
This sort of cultural-pluralism argument against universally imposing 
democracy runs the risk of turning into an Orientalist argument—one that sees 
Islam and democracy as incompatible, or that perceives people inexperienced 
with democracy as incapable of fully navigating its privileges.72 But certainly 
Islam, as a religion and a larger cultural influence, can co-exist with 
representative democracy. Turkey, secular as it has become, demonstrates the 
compatibility between democracy and Islam. Indeed, when it comes to suffrage 
and women’s rights, Turkey has been ahead of the western curve. Women in 
Turkey were granted the right to vote and to be elected to municipal offices in 
1930, and in 1934 they gained the right to run and vote in all elections. 73 In 
France, women were not given the right to vote until 1944, and in Switzerland, 
not until 1971.74 That Islam and democracy can be compatible, however, does 
not mean that they are the most compatible or that where additional ethnic and 
cultural differences may be at play, democracy is workable—at least when 
imposed by an outsider. 
Those advocating the forcible imposition of democracy respond by arguing 
that democracy is culturally neutral: 
Critics of nation-building point out that outsiders can never build nations, if that 
means creating or repairing all the cultural, social, and historical ties that bind people 
together as a nation. What we are really talking about is state-building—that is, 
creating or strengthening such government institutions as armies, police forces, 
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judiciaries, central banks, tax-collection agencies, health and educations systems, and 
the like.75 
But state institutions do not exist in a vacuum separate from the cultural norms 
that surround them. The U.S. experiment with democracy is a testament to the 
fact that democratic institutions and ideals are slowly woven into the fabric of 
society and culture—they are not wholly separate. Indeed, elementary history 
and civics lessons taught in the United States ingrain in children the stories—
the shared culture—of Martin Luther King, the Boston Tea Party, the Civil 
Rights Movement, and so forth. These lessons together teach U.S. citizens how 
democracy arose from and out of our cultural history; they are a part of what 
Benedict Anderson has dubbed our “imagined community.”76 
To be sure, the whole of western progress from the Renaissance and 
Enlightenment forward is envisioned now, in retrospect, as part of an almost 
inevitable movement toward freedom that resulted in the democratic 
institutions the United States cherishes today. To say that democracy is 
somehow distinct from the most basic aspects of U.S. culture would fly in the 
face not only of our education, but also of the community beliefs that go into 
making the United States a nation. Again, this is not to say that countries 
without histories of democracies cannot create them, but those democratic 
movements stand a much better chance of success if they are indigenous and 
have some relationship to the nation’s identity and history. This idea that 
democracy works best when it comes from the ground up coincides well with 
Mansfield and Snyder’s argument that the focus, at least for the United States, 
should not be on imposing democracy, but rather on helping democratic 
movements manage the instability and potential for conflict that comes with 
change in political systems. For example, the United States could help by 
providing “golden parachutes” for former elites threatened by democracy,77 or 
employment for “communist nomenklatura, military officer corps, nuclear 
scientists, and smokestack industrialists.”78 This is to say, it could help by 
providing incentives for those with a strong stake in the old regimes (and hence 
a strong stake in making a transition to democracy difficult) to embrace 
democracy. 
Certainly there are examples of the forcible imposition of democracy that 
have been relatively successful—even in countries that were relatively 
unaffiliated with the democratic experience. Post–World War II Japan is a 
notable example. However, the Japanese transformation to democracy was 
successful in part because significant Japanese cultural institutions were left 
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intact.79 It is doubtful, given the Japanese people’s loyalty to Emperor Hirohito, 
that the transition would have been so smooth without his consent to the 
surrender.80 Moreover, the Emperor’s royal position, one of the key cultural 
institutions, was allowed to live on—albeit in a neutered form.81 It was this 
neutering of the revered Emperor’s place in Shintoism that prevented the 
previously engendered kamikaze fanaticism from turning into the sort of 
insurgency and religious fanaticism that is now wreaking havoc in Iraq. Many in 
the West called for the Emperor to be tried for war crimes, but MacArthur 
refused because he knew that Japan would be easier to rule with the Emperor 
left in power, at least nominally.82 
It is also questionable whether the Japanese democratic experience would 
have been successful had it not been for the quick rise of China after the war, 
which forced Japan to rely on its western allies to counterbalance the emerging 
Maoist juggernaut.83 Further, Japan remains to this day a marginally “occupied” 
nation.84 United States military forces are stationed throughout the Japanese 
islands, and the Japanese constitution, for all intents and purposes written by 
MacArthur and the Allied Powers,85 continues to forbid Japanese offensive 
forces.86 Finally, democracy was not a completely foreign system in Japan prior 
to the end of the war. Indeed, in the 1920s, before the militarist takeover, Japan 
had a parliamentary system.87 Without question this exposure, short-lived as it 
was, aided the transition. 
In postwar Germany, the transition to democracy was also greatly aided by 
a democratic tradition preexisting the war. Germans were familiar and well 
acquainted with the democratic experiment. Indeed, Hitler himself ran for 
office on several occasions and as a result of the Nazi’s parliamentary strength 
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was eventually appointed as Chancellor, paving the way for his eventual 
consolidation of power.88 Unfortunately, the Germans had also seen how 
quickly democracy could be turned on its head and its freedoms usurped. Like 
Japan, Germany remained democratic, in part, because Allied forces continued 
to occupy it through the end of the Cold War and still maintain a military 
presence there today. That sort of long-lasting occupation is untenable now, 
and, indeed, it is undesirable—untenable because it saps the interventionists of 
military and economic resources and undesirable because it continues, at least 
to a degree, to limit a nation’s control of not only its own territory, but also its 
own destiny. 
Although democracy imposed through force has been successful in the past, 
that success depended on several factors: the particular, democratic histories of 
the nations being transformed, the extensiveness of the military occupations, 
competing geopolitical forces such as the Cold War, the lack or at least the 
curtailment of religious-type fervor, more widespread international 
commitment to the particular military occupations, and more widespread 
commitment from the home populations of the “occupiers.”89 But on an even 
more fundamental and abstract level, the idea of “imposing” anything on a 
group of people is antithetical to the cornerstone of democracy—that the 
people should choose their government. Not only do these competing ideas not 
mesh well in theory; it is often even worse in practice. Iraq is a telling example. 
At times, the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) paternally held 
the Iraqis’ hands as they tried to determine what Iraqi democracy would look 
like; at other times, the CPA dictated what the new government would be.90 For 
instance, the CPA selected the twenty-five members of the Iraqi Governing 
Council,91 and it selected the members of its replacement, the Iraqi Interim 
Government.92 Indeed, some have questioned whether the U.S. occupation 
abided by the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention by 
not leaving the legal, political, and economic structures of the occupied territory 
intact.93 
It could be said that the West’s drafting of the Japanese constitution has 
worked fairly well. But was it a product of democracy? No. It was a product of 
outside intervention. How can a democracy retain its legitimacy if its foundation 
was not formed from a democratic process? Truth be told, democracy elsewhere 
will have an uphill battle. Japan was able to win that battle, in part, because of 
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its previous democratic governance—democracy was indigenous rather than 
foisted upon it.94 
The imposition of a new form of government, aside from being in tension 
with the very idea of democracy, also creates practical obstacles because it soon 
engenders resentment among the local populations. Even in situations where 
the invasion and toppling of a brutal dictator are welcomed by the people of a 
country, “[a]n army of liberation becomes an army of occupation the moment it 
wins. As an army of occupation, it encounters more and more resistance the 
longer it stays.”95 As time passes, populations become less tolerant of outside 
armed forces and view them as hostile to their interests. Especially in countries 
with histories of subjugation and colonialism, such as those in the Middle East 
and Africa, the return of western troops is likely to be viewed with skepticism. 
The recent Iraq conflict bears this out. As the army of liberation rode into 
Baghdad, the people were jubilant and welcomed the Coalition.96 But as time 
has dragged on and the economic and security situations have not improved, 
more and more animus has been directed, often violently, toward Coalition 
forces. 
The protracted stay, not to mention the invasion itself, irritates and angers 
the local population because it is an affront to their nation’s sovereignty. But 
aside from creating local opposition to the occupying force—a practical 
problem—the usurpation of sovereignty is also a philosophical problem for pro-
interventionists. Sovereignty is one of the guiding principles of the international 
system, and respect for it has helped foster a peaceful world since the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648.97 On a macro level, sovereignty recognizes a nation’s ability 
to direct its own course and to protect the sanctity of its territory. On a micro 
level, by allowing the nation this freedom, the principle of sovereignty also 
recognizes the right of individuals within that nation to choose their own 
government. If a nation has an oppressive regime, then sovereignty may still 
protect the nation’s ability to be independent, but it risks neglecting the 
individual’s freedom. But imposing democracy also imposes a certain system of 
governance on individuals. Moreover, given the major obstacles to success for 
interventionists and the unlikelihood that individuals will be fully enfranchised 
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in the new regime, the affront to a nation’s sovereignty is not worth the risk. 
With each incursion on sovereignty, the international balance of power and rule 
of law are chipped away, removing one of the main obstacles to war. 
The difficulties associated with forcefully imposing democracy dovetail into 
the second of John F. Kennedy’s points: that even if the United States has all 
the right ideas, it does not have the resources to do the job.98 The ease with 
which the United States and the “Coalition of the Willing” were able to 
overthrow the Ba’athist regime and penetrate Baghdad speaks volumes about 
U.S. global military supremacy. But toppling the previous regime is only the 
start of the battle. As of mid-December 2006, Congress had appropriated $379 
billion for the conflict in Iraq.99 And in the final weeks of 2006, President Bush 
requested an additional $100 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan.100 These numbers 
have and will continue to climb.  This of course does not include the additional 
contributions from the Coalition. Moreover, it does not count the human costs. 
More than 3,000 U.S. troops have died in the Iraqi conflict. Both the economic 
strain and western constituencies’ impatience with seeing their soldiers die in 
battle—especially a battle that may not be of any strategic interest to the 
intervener—mean that an intervening government has a very short leash and a 
limited ability to engage in protracted regime changes designed to result in 
democracy. As Alexis de Tocqueville put it, “[I]t is an arduous undertaking to 
excite the enthusiasm of a democratic nation for any theory which does not 
have a visible, direct, and immediate bearing on the occupations of their daily 
lives.”101 Professor Reisman puts de Tocqueville’s argument within the context 
of regime change, stating, “The process of regime change may put great strain 
on the economic resources of the changer and its national economy. And the 
longer and more widespread the economic strain, the more tenuous the 
domestic support for regime change becomes.”102 
No doubt the 2006 congressional elections and public-opinion polls are 
powerful evidence for the growing domestic discontent with the prolonged war 
in Iraq. A national poll conducted in August 2007 indicates that sixty-nine 
percent of Americans disapproved of how the war in Iraq was being handled.103 
The great irony here is that convincing the domestic populace that they have an 
interest in the conflict runs in opposition to the task of convincing the 
international community that the purpose of the intervention is a benevolent, 
selfless one. And convincing the international community of the intervener’s 
selflessness is necessary to avoid international opprobrium, which is one of the 
key checks on unilateral action, especially by a superpower. 
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The economic and military costs associated with forcibly imposing 
democracy are even more untenable today given the passionate ideological 
interests of many potential adversaries and given recent developments in 
military technology and tactics. The preeminent military power of the United 
States enables it to obliterate a country in the blink of an eye—maybe a couple 
of blinks if it is relying on conventional forces.104 It could thus control any 
nation’s and virtually any individual’s fate.105 But military power does not 
translate into “behavior control”; the United States has been unable to prevent 
the proliferation of even the crudest of weapons, and an armed 
counterinsurgency, equipped with discipline, self-sacrifice, ruthlessness, and an 
intense emotional ideology, can be an insurmountable obstacle to nations 
wanting to impose democracy by force.106 Nor is Iraq the only example. Both the 
Shining Path in Peru107 and the Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka108 demonstrate the 
potency with which a small insurrection can debilitate entire countries.109 
Though guerrilla-style counterinsurgencies have gained new potency, some of 
the tactics being used and the challenges insurgencies can pose are reminiscent 
of the American Revolution.110 Though the colonists relied in part on 
conventional warfare, they also relied on insurgent, guerilla warfare to stymie 
British plans for continued occupation.111 The technological advent of car 
bombs, suicide bombers, and other ingenious but heinous tactics has only 
amplified the effectiveness of counterinsurgencies. 
The economic and military costs associated with forcibly imposing 
democracy lead to additional problems that continue to compound. As the costs 
mount and more resources, including troops, are needed to win the battle, the 
prospect of winning with a sufficiently large and adequately trained volunteer 
force becomes less and less likely. Potential volunteers begin to believe, 
wrongly or rightly, that the mission serves no domestic interest yet involves 
great personal and national risks, and so they decide against enlisting. Again, 
the situation in Iraq is instructive. United States generals recently called for 
more troops to be sent to Iraq, arguing that without more people-power the 
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U.S. armed forces are on the brink of collapse.112 Unfortunately, there are not 
many more to give, as the reservists have already been sent on extended tours 
and the U.S. military is on the verge of being overstretched.113 This shortage of 
human resources not only decreases the chances of successfully imposing 
democracy, but it also leads to a corresponding erosion of democratic freedom 
at home. One form of this erosion is the threat of conscription. But democratic 
freedoms are also eroded because as the conflict intensifies, so does the risk of 
attack at home.114 Even if that risk does not increase once war has begun, 
wartime almost inevitably leads to shrinking domestic liberties as freedom of 
speech and travel are curtailed and lawmakers prioritize security over liberty. 
This is not to say that during times of war it is inappropriate to alter the balance 
between security and liberty, but that in the absence of prolonged conflict, the 
balance permits greater liberty.115 
Finally and most fundamentally, forcibly imposed democracy is going to cost 
lives. Any time force is used, people will die. In some instances the cost of 
action—the lives lost as a result of intervention—will be worth the lives saved. 
Rwanda and World War II are clear examples. Nevertheless, the cost of 
intervention should always be weighed carefully when deciding whether going 
to war is the right decision. The human death toll mounts not just as a result of 
bullets and bombs, but also because the conflict runs the high risk of creating 
internally displaced populations and refugees, disrupting food supplies, and 
spreading disease. In Iraq it is estimated that somewhere between 50,000 and 
655,000 Iraqis have died, as of the beginning of 2007, as a result of the invasion 
and its downstream consequences.116 Certainly there are ways to mitigate these 
harms and reduce the damage done by a forceful intervention. However, given 
the hurdles facing a policy of forcibly imposed democracy, the more practical 
and wise solution—except perhaps in the most grave situations—is to work to 
cultivate and support indigenous movements for democracy from within the 
state. This not only avoids such costs as human life, loss of sovereignty, and 
potential cultural imperialism, but it also helps to avoid many of the problems 
associated with intervention such as resistance to outsiders, costs to the 
intervener, and conflict fatigue among the intervener’s populace. 
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IV 
CONCLUSION 
The Arthurian dilemma looms large today. The United States and other 
western democracies value their freedom and their method of governance. The 
desire to share democracy with those who are oppressed on a daily basis is 
without question laudable. But as Henry Kissinger put it, “When moral 
principles are applied without regard to historical conditions, the result is 
usually an increase in suffering rather than its amelioration.”117 In other words, 
good intentions should not blind us to very real and very likely obstacles. And 
in the case of forcibly imposed democracy, the obstacles to trying to spread its 
associated freedoms around the world loom large. In essence, the United States 
or others who may want to impose democracy by force are not mighty enough 
to do the job and do it well. By trying and failing, those who use force to impose 
democracy may create new problems and exacerbate the conditions they were 
trying to ameliorate. But even if the litany of practical problems did not exist, 
the use of might to make right should be avoided because it compromises and 
contradicts the very foundations, the very “rights,” that democracy values and 
that the international system was built on, including pluralism, difference of 
opinion, and sovereignty. This is not to say that people around the globe should 
stop their efforts to expand freedom and increase the quality of global life. But 
the use of force—of might—is neither an effective nor a philosophically 
consistent method of doing so. 
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